Accountability

PALESTINE — THE GENOCIDE, INTERNATIONAL COMPLICITY AND THE PERSECUTION OF THOSE WHO RESIST

What is happening in Palestine can no longer be reduced to an ordinary military conflict between Israel and Hamas. We are facing one of the gravest humanitarian and international legal catastrophes of our time — a genocide, an ongoing occupation and the systematic destruction of the conditions on which the Palestinian people depend for their survival.

But the tragedy is not only about Israel’s actions. It is also about the international powers that enable them, the political institutions that protect them, and the Palestinian authorities who oppress their own population.

UN: Israel is committing genocide in Gaza

On 16 September 2025, the UN’s independent commission of inquiry concluded that Israel had committed and continued to commit genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.

The commission identified four of the five categories of acts under the Genocide Convention and found that the requisite intent to destroy the Palestinian group in Gaza, in whole or in part, was present.

This was not a loose political accusation, but a serious legal conclusion from an official UN investigative body.

But developments did not stop there.

On 14 October 2026, the UN commission of inquiry published its new report to the General Assembly, A/81/430. The report examines killings, violence and abuses by Israeli and Palestinian security forces since October 2023.

The commission confirms that Israeli authorities and forces continue to commit genocidal acts with the intent to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, in whole or in part.

According to the report, even after the ceasefire in October 2025, Israeli forces continued to use heavy weapons, artillery, drones and snipers against densely populated civilian areas.

By 30 September 2026, more than 1,431 people had been killed and 5,026 injured in Gaza since the ceasefire. Those killed included at least 300 children and 130 women.

The UN also describes how the so-called Yellow Line has gradually moved further into Gaza and effectively functions as a new border, expanding Israel’s territorial control.

This is therefore not a completed crime for the world merely to look back on. The UN is documenting continuing genocidal acts while international rhetoric about a ceasefire and peace persists.

The United States’ responsibility — weapons, military support and diplomatic protection

Through extensive arms deliveries, military assistance, intelligence cooperation and diplomatic support, the United States has been a crucial supporter of Israel.

This raises an unavoidable question of shared international responsibility:

What responsibility does a state bear when it continues to supply weapons and military support in the face of serious and extensive legal findings of genocide?

Article I of the Genocide Convention obliges states to prevent and punish genocide. The International Court of Justice has established that the duty to prevent is triggered when a state becomes aware of a serious risk of genocide.

This does not mean that every arms delivery automatically constitutes complicity in genocide. But states cannot disclaim their international obligations simply by invoking diplomatic alliances or strategic interests.

The United States’ political and military support must therefore be assessed in light of the specific actions, the available knowledge and the state’s ability to prevent further crimes.

One cannot claim to defend human rights and international law on the one hand while, on the other, maintaining military support that helps sustain the conditions documented by the UN.

The Palestinian Authority — when one’s own authorities also persecute resistance

And here we come to another extremely serious dimension that is all too often overlooked.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), which should represent and protect the Palestinian population, has itself become the subject of serious UN criticism for repressing its own population.

In report A/81/430, the UN commission of inquiry directs explicit and serious criticism at the Palestinian Authority’s security forces.

Among other things, the commission documents:

•Arbitrary arrests and detention of political critics, activists, journalists and human rights defenders.

•Threats, intimidation, torture and other ill-treatment of people who criticise the Palestinian Authority.

•The violent dispersal of demonstrations, including protests against the Palestinian Authority and the war in Gaza.

•Attacks on journalists and women who document and publicise abuses.

•Killings during security force operations and a lack of independent investigations.

•The detention of prisoners of conscience and cases in which the authorities allegedly ignored court orders for release.

Among other cases, the UN describes a female journalism student in Jenin who was killed on 28 December 2024. She had documented abuses committed by the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and published critical material on social media. According to witnesses, a member of the security forces had threatened her the day before her death.

The commission also investigated the killing of a man and the wounding of a 15-year-old boy during a security operation in December 2024. It concluded that the security forces had used unlawful and excessive lethal force and that the State of Palestine had thereby violated the rights to life and personal security.

Even more serious is the report’s description of security cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.

During Operation Protect the Homeland in Jenin in December 2024 and January 2025, PA security forces conducted operations against Palestinian armed groups. The UN reports that the operation took place with the approval and coordination of the Israeli authorities. Israel subsequently launched its own military operation in the area.

The UN also describes a so-called revolving-door practice, whereby people detained by one authority may subsequently be detained by the other.

It is a serious matter when a Palestinian authority cooperates on security with the occupying power while that power is carrying out military operations, occupation and extensive abuses against the population the authority claims to represent.

The commission’s overall conclusion is that the Palestinian Authority continues to repress civilians and political opponents, including journalists and human rights defenders, and that this repression has led to killings, physical and psychological harm, and an increasingly restricted space for civil society.

It is important to emphasise that the report does not establish that all the persecuted activists were specifically targeted because they opposed the genocide. It does, however, document both the repression of critics and the suppression of protests against the war in Gaza.

This is a revelation that deserves the same attention as Israeli abuses.

Palestinian self-determination cannot be reduced to the right to have a Palestinian government. It is also about the population’s right to criticise its leaders, organise, demonstrate, document crimes and resist oppression without being threatened, tortured, imprisoned or killed.

A Palestinian authority that oppresses its own population and cooperates on security with the occupying power must also be held accountable.

Two levels of oppression — one fundamental demand for accountability

There is a crucial difference between Israel’s responsibility as an occupying power and the Palestinian Authority’s responsibility as a Palestinian authority. The two cannot be equated in scale, character or legal responsibility.

But both must be assessed under international law.

Israel must be held accountable for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the illegal occupation.

The Palestinian Authority must be held accountable for abuses against its own population, arbitrary detention, torture, unlawful use of force and the suppression of political and civil rights.

No government, authority or political movement has the right to demand immunity for its actions simply because it claims to represent an oppressed population.

And no Palestinian activist should have to choose between Israeli oppression on the one hand and oppression by the Palestinian Authority on the other.

The right to resist genocide must not be replaced by a duty to obey one’s own rulers.

The Palestinian people have the right to freedom, self-determination, dignity and political representation — not merely to be administered by an authority that cannot tolerate criticism.

The latest UN report therefore demonstrates something that international debate all too often ignores: the struggle for Palestine is not only about stopping Israel’s crimes. It is also about ensuring that the Palestinian people themselves have the freedom to determine their future.

No justice without accountability. No self-determination without freedom. No liberation if resistance to oppression is itself suppressed.

DENMARK — POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL COMPLICITY

Denmark cannot declare itself neutral while Danish resources support Israel’s warfare

When we discuss international complicity, we must also turn our attention to Denmark.

Denmark is not merely an outside observer commenting on developments from the sidelines. Denmark has concrete political, military, industrial, logistical and economic ties to the military infrastructure used by Israel.

The Danish government has repeatedly declared its support for international law, human rights and the protection of civilians. Danish politicians have condemned abuses, expressed concern and called for restraint.

But political declarations are worthless unless they are translated into action.

When a state is aware of a serious risk of genocide and continues to permit activities that may help sustain the crimes or the illegal occupation, a question arises about that state’s international responsibility.

Denmark must therefore be judged by its actual actions — not its press releases.

1. The Danish government and Parliament — political declarations without consistent action

Since October 2023, Denmark has had access to extensive documentation of Israel’s military operations, the destruction in Gaza and serious violations of international humanitarian law.

In January 2024, the International Court of Justice found that the rights invoked by South Africa under the Genocide Convention were plausible and that there was a real and imminent risk of irreparable harm to the protected rights. The Court ordered provisional measures against Israel.

In July 2024, the ICJ concluded that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territories is unlawful and that other states have a duty not to recognise or assist in maintaining the unlawful situation.

In September 2025, the UN commission of inquiry concluded that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza.

On 26 October 2026, the commission published another grave conclusion: Israel has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the occupied Palestinian territories, while genocidal acts continue in Gaza.

This is therefore not a sudden or unforeseeable legal development.

Over an extended period, the Danish state has had access to information that should have triggered a far more consistent review of all Danish ties to Israel’s military activities.

Nevertheless, Denmark has not imposed a general arms embargo on Israel, has not ensured a comprehensive public and independent investigation of all relevant Danish supplies, and has not established a sufficiently effective mechanism to ensure that Danish companies and institutions do not contribute to the unlawful activities.

It is not enough to point out that the authorities conduct individual assessments or that Denmark complies with international agreements.

International law is not an optional political guideline. It is a legal obligation.

2. Bilateral agreements with third countries do not override the Genocide Convention

One of the most problematic aspects of Denmark’s arms policy is the way exports of Danish F-35 components are handled.

Denmark participates in the international F-35 programme and supplies components for the fighter jets through the US production and supply system.

The Danish government has repeatedly emphasised that exports often go to the United States and that the ultimate user of the components is not necessarily known at the time of export.

This arrangement raises a fundamental legal question:

Can Denmark avoid its international obligations by sending military components to the United States when those components form part of a weapons system subsequently supplied to Israel?

The answer is that an intermediate destination or a bilateral agreement does not, in itself, exempt Denmark from its responsibility under international law.

Article 6(3) of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) expressly provides that a state must not authorise a transfer of conventional arms if, at the time of authorisation, it knows that the arms or equipment will be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or other listed war crimes.

Article 7 also requires risk assessment and refusal if the relevant risks cannot be mitigated.

It is therefore not sufficient to point out that the United States is the formal recipient.

Denmark remains responsible for its own export licences and must assess the actual circumstances, including known end users and likely uses.

The same follows from the general rules on treaty obligations. Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention establish that treaties must be performed in good faith and that a state cannot invoke domestic law as justification for failing to fulfil its international obligations.

A bilateral defence or cooperation agreement between Denmark and the United States therefore cannot annul or override Denmark’s obligations under the Genocide Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty or the UN Charter.

A bilateral arms agreement with a third country does not override the Genocide Convention.

This is a fundamental principle that the Danish government cannot talk its way around.

3. Terma, Multicut, Saab Denmark and Flatirons — Danish industry in the F-35 fighter jet supply chain

Denmark has a direct industrial interest in the F-35 programme.

Through investigative journalism, Danwatch and the daily newspaper Information identified four Danish companies that were confirmed to be supplying components, software or related services to the F-35 programme at the time of their investigation:

•Terma A/S: Supplies a range of components for the F-35, including parts for the aircraft’s weapons pylons and other structural components.

•Multicut A/S: Produces various aluminium and structural components for the aircraft.

•Saab Denmark: Has supplied parts for the aircraft’s self-protection system.

•Flatirons Solutions: Has supplied and maintained software related to the aircraft programme.

Danwatch has also documented that Terma components are incorporated into Israeli F-35 aircraft and that an Israeli F-35 aircraft with Danish control equipment participated in the attack on Mawasi in Gaza on 13 July 2024.

The attack struck an area where civilians had sought refuge. Several bombs weighing a tonne each were used, and the attack caused extensive civilian casualties.

This is a concrete example of Danish-made components forming part of a military system used by Israel in Gaza.

It is particularly problematic that the Danish authorities continue to permit Danish companies to participate in a military production system whose end products are used by a state that the UN commission of inquiry has found to be committing genocide.

Denmark does not merely have a political interest in the F-35 programme. Denmark also has a responsibility to ensure that Danish production does not contribute to serious international crimes.

And this responsibility does not disappear because the components are assembled in the United States.

4. Maersk, DSV and H. Folmer — the Danish logistical connection

Military support is not only about producing weapons.

It is also about transport, freight, ports, ships, supply chains and the logistical infrastructure that makes it possible to move military equipment from producer to end user.

Several Danish companies feature here.

Maersk

In February 2025, the investigative journalism organisation Danwatch published an extensive investigation into Maersk’s transport of military equipment to Israel.

Drawing on sources including bills of lading and transport data, the investigation documented that Maersk had transported thousands of tonnes of military equipment and components to Israel between September 2023 and September 2024.

The shipments included parts for armoured vehicles and military tactical vehicles.

Among other things, Danwatch documented shipments of HEMTT military vehicles and other military components.

The investigation also showed that Maersk vessels had transported military equipment from the United States to Israel via international shipping routes.

For its part, Maersk has stated that it does not transport weapons or ammunition to active conflict zones and that it subjects cargo bound for conflict areas to enhanced checks.

But the documented transport of military equipment still raises a fundamental question about the company’s responsibility for the supply chains it makes available.

DSV and H. Folmer & Co.

In May 2026, The Ditch published an investigation entitled:

Danish ship transporting tonnes of weapons through Spanish waters to Israel – arranged by DSV.

The investigation concerned the transport of weapons and military equipment to Israel on a Danish-flagged ship belonging to H. Folmer & Co., with DSV having arranged the transport according to the investigation.

The matter was subsequently raised politically in the Danish Parliament.

On 17 June 2026, Trine Pertou Mach submitted a written question to the Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs asking why a Danish shipping company could transport weapons and military equipment to Israel on Danish-flagged ships and what options the Danish authorities had for intervening.

The minister’s final answer was published on 25 June 2026.

It is noteworthy that the issue of Danish transport of military equipment to Israel has thus been the subject of specific parliamentary scrutiny.

It is not enough for the government simply to take note of such information or point out that companies must comply with applicable rules.

There must be a specific investigation into:

•What military equipment is being transported.

•Who the sender and ultimate recipient are.

•What military use the equipment has.

•Whether the transport takes place directly or indirectly on behalf of Israeli military authorities.

•What the carriers know about the end user and use.

•Whether the shipments are compatible with Denmark’s international obligations.

A Danish company does not have to manufacture a bomb itself to contribute to a military operation. Transport and logistical support may also constitute relevant forms of assistance, depending on the specific knowledge, intent and contribution.

And that is precisely why these supply chains must be investigated.

5. Denmark cannot confine its responsibility to Gaza — the same military systems are used throughout the region

Denmark’s responsibility is not limited to Palestine and Gaza.

The military systems, components, weapons platforms and logistical supply chains to which Denmark contributes have much broader uses.

Israel’s F-35 fighter jets form part of the country’s military capability and have been used in operations against countries including Iran, Syria and Lebanon.

The Danish components form part of an international weapons system that can be used across different military operations.

When Denmark supplies components to the F-35 programme, the consequences therefore cannot be assessed solely in relation to Gaza.

The same applies to the transport of military equipment to Israel.

If Danish companies provide transport and logistics services for military supply chains, it must be investigated whether the equipment is subsequently used in operations that violate international law.

Israel’s military attacks on Iran, Syria and Lebanon raise separate questions concerning the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and the right to self-defence.

Denmark cannot invoke one standard for Iran, another for Russia and a third for Israel.

International law applies regardless of who carries out the attacks.

Danish companies and authorities cannot disclaim responsibility for military supply chains simply because the specific operations take place outside Gaza.

6. The legal situation in Denmark — Oxfam, Amnesty and ActionAid Denmark were denied access to a judicial review of the legality of arms exports

One of the most serious aspects of the Danish case is the lack of access to judicial review.

In spring 2024, Amnesty International Denmark, Oxfam Denmark, ActionAid Denmark and the Palestinian human rights organisation Al-Haq brought proceedings against the Danish state.

The organisations sought to stop Danish exports of military components to Israel through the F-35 programme.

Their claim was that the exports violated Denmark’s international obligations, including the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU’s common rules on arms exports, because there was a risk that the components could be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law.

On 11 April 2025, the Eastern High Court dismissed the case on the grounds that the organisations lacked legal standing.

The organisations appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

On 18 March 2026, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.

The Supreme Court did not rule on whether Danish arms exports were lawful or unlawful. The Court found that the organisations lacked the necessary legal standing to have the question reviewed.

This means that the central substantive issue — whether Danish export licences for the F-35 programme are compatible with Denmark’s international obligations — was not examined on its merits in this case.

This is a serious issue concerning legal safeguards.

When the authorities’ decisions on arms exports cannot be reviewed at the initiative of organisations working on human rights and humanitarian protection, the practical scope for independent oversight is significantly restricted.

This does not mean that Danish politicians or companies are legally immune. Other legal avenues may remain available, including other plaintiffs, complaint procedures, parliamentary scrutiny and criminal investigations where the conditions are met.

But the ruling shows that access to judicial review of the state’s export decisions can be very narrow.

And this raises a fundamental democratic question:

If even established human rights organisations such as Oxfam, Amnesty and ActionAid Denmark cannot obtain a review of the legality of state decisions, who will be able to exercise the necessary oversight?

This becomes particularly problematic when the state is also the authority that issues and administers the relevant licences.

A state should not be able to avoid effective legal scrutiny of its own decisions because the people and organisations seeking to have those decisions reviewed are denied access to the courts.

The government simply declaring its own decisions lawful is not an acceptable substitute for legal accountability.

7. Danish politicians and mainstream media — normalisation, trivialisation and a lack of accountability

Denmark’s responsibility does not end with arms exports, transport and the military industry.

It also encompasses the political and public response to the documented crimes.

Danish politicians have repeatedly emphasised the need to protect civilians and comply with international law. But this rhetoric stands in stark contrast to the lack of consistency in practical policy.

When the UN commission of inquiry concludes that Israel is committing genocide, this should have concrete political, economic and legal consequences.

When the International Court of Justice finds that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied territories is unlawful, Denmark should ensure that neither public nor private Danish activities help maintain the unlawful situation.

When Danish companies transport military equipment to Israel, the government should investigate the shipments and ensure that applicable rules are enforced.

When Danish arms manufacturers supply components for Israeli fighter jets, the export licences should be subjected to a genuine and independent risk assessment.

The same responsibility applies to the media.

Danish mainstream media have a crucial role in informing the public about international crimes, state responsibility and Denmark’s own connections to the conflicts.

When the UN’s legal conclusions are downplayed, when the genocide is reduced to a symmetrical conflict narrative, and when Denmark’s own role in military supply chains is not investigated sufficiently, the public’s ability to hold those in power accountable is weakened.

It is legitimate to debate the UN’s conclusions, legal interpretations and the responsibilities of the various actors. But it is not journalistically defensible to ignore or systematically downplay documented facts.

The media have no legal duty to follow the government’s foreign policy. They do, however, have a special democratic obligation to investigate the exercise of power, inform the public and ask critical questions.

It is therefore necessary to put the following questions to the Danish media:

Why have Denmark’s military and logistical ties to Israel not received more extensive and sustained journalistic coverage?

Why is the role of Danish companies in the F-35 programme not followed up with the same intensity as political discussions about arms exports?

Why is the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Oxfam case not treated as a fundamental issue of access to judicial scrutiny?

And why is it so difficult to achieve a consistent public debate about Denmark’s possible complicity in international crimes?

This is not, in itself, proof that Danish journalists or media outlets have committed a crime. But journalistic passivity, a lack of critical scrutiny and the uncritical repetition of political narratives can have serious democratic consequences.

The media’s job is not to protect the government’s foreign policy line. Their job is to scrutinise it.

8. Danish pension funds — the public’s pension savings in companies linked to the illegal occupation

Another economic dimension is the investments made by Danish pension funds.

Through occupational pensions and statutory schemes, millions of Danes contribute to pension systems that manage enormous amounts of capital.

These funds are invested globally, and pension funds therefore bear considerable responsibility for which companies they finance.

In March 2026, ActionAid Denmark published the report:

Money out of illegal settlements — On Danish pension companies’ investments in companies profiting from Israel’s illegal settlements.

The report documents that, at the end of 2025, Danish pension companies held a total of DKK 6.3 billion in shares and corporate bonds in six companies included on the UN list of companies operating in the illegal Israeli settlements.

The six companies are:

•Airbnb

•Booking.com

•Expedia

•Fosun International

•Heidelberg Materials

•Motorola Solutions

The total investments are distributed as follows:

Total: DKK 6,301.2 million.

These are not investments in abstract financial products disconnected from reality.

The report describes specific economic activities in the occupied territories.

These include:

•Airbnb, Booking.com and Expedia, which facilitate holiday stays and rentals in illegal settlements.

•Motorola Solutions, which supplies surveillance and security technology to Israeli military and settlement-related actors.

•Heidelberg Materials, which is involved in the exploitation of natural resources and the production of materials connected to the settlements.

It is important to distinguish between investments in companies operating in illegal settlements and the direct financing of military operations or genocide. The report documents the former. It does not document that all pension investments finance weapons or directly contribute to genocide.

But this does not alter the central legal and ethical issue: Danish pension savings must not help maintain an unlawful situation.

The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion of July 2024 establishes that states must refrain from providing aid or assistance in maintaining Israel’s unlawful presence in the occupied Palestinian territories.

This obligation is not confined to the state as a direct actor. It also raises questions about the economic relationships that help maintain the unlawful situation.

It is therefore not enough for pension funds to point out that the investments are made through ordinary global equity portfolios.

They have an independent responsibility to examine their investments, identify risks of human rights violations and act when their investments contribute to serious adverse impacts.

It is particularly noteworthy that three pension companies — PBU, AkademikerPension and Lærernes Pension — fully divested the investments covered by the report during 2025.

This shows that action is possible.

Why, then, should other pension funds continue to hold investments worth billions in companies included on the UN list?

ATP — direct co-owner and financial partner in the Danish defence company TERMA

ATP’s role differs significantly from the ordinary portfolio investments described above.

ATP is not merely an institutional investor with indirect shareholdings in companies linked to Israel. Through ATP Langsigtet Dansk Kapital, ATP has become a direct minority owner of TERMA A/S — a key Danish defence company supplying components to the F-35 fighter jet programme, including systems incorporated into Israeli fighter jets.

ATP announced the investment on 19 June 2024. According to ATP’s own press release, the investment amounts to a single-digit number of billions of Danish kroner, comprising both an equity investment and a loan facility for TERMA.

This is therefore not simply a matter of ATP having purchased a small shareholding. ATP has made a substantial overall capital facility available for the company’s further development and growth.

The ownership register shows that ATP Langsigtet Dansk Kapital holds an ownership stake of 10–14.99% and 10% of the voting rights in TERMA. ATP is thus a significant minority owner with a direct financial interest in the company’s continued growth and value creation.

ATP also took a seat on TERMA’s board through an ordinary board member. ATP therefore has not only a financial relationship with the company, but also a formal seat on its highest governing body.

The Thomas B. Thrige Foundation remains the majority owner.

It is particularly significant that, according to ATP’s own announcement, its investment was made as part of TERMA’s growth strategy. TERMA had set out an ambition to double its revenue over three years, and the injected capital was intended, among other things, to support the company’s further growth and acquisition opportunities.

ATP has thus helped make equity and financing available to TERMA, which produces components for the F-35 fighter jets that Israel uses to commit war crimes in Gaza and the region as a whole.

This considerably sharpens the question of ATP’s responsibility.

ATP’s connection to TERMA is not a peripheral or indirect investment. It consists of direct ownership, a substantial injection of capital and board representation in the company whose components are incorporated into Israeli F-35 fighter jets.

When it is also documented that Terma components are incorporated into Israeli F-35 aircraft and that a Danish-equipped Israeli F-35 aircraft was used in the attack on Mawasi in Gaza on 13 July 2024, there are grounds for asking ATP far more specific questions than pension funds holding only ordinary, passive shareholdings.

This does not mean that ATP’s investment in itself proves criminal complicity in war crimes or genocide. But it does mean that ATP’s direct financial and institutional involvement in TERMA must be investigated separately and in far greater depth.

Among other things, questions must be asked about:

•What ATP knew about TERMA’s supplies to the F-35 programme and the Israeli end users when the investment agreement was concluded in 2024.

•What ATP has since learned about the use of Terma components in Israeli fighter jets and the documented attacks in Gaza.

•Whether ATP’s investment managers and board representative have carried out specific assessments of the company’s supplies and the risk of complicity in international crimes.

•Whether ATP has imposed requirements on TERMA concerning end-user arrangements, export controls, human rights and the cessation of supplies carrying an unacceptable risk.

•What conditions apply to ATP’s loan facility and whether the financing directly or indirectly supports production, capacity expansion or activities with military applications.

•Whether ATP has reconsidered the investment, the loan facility or its continued board representation following the publication of further documentation.

It is not enough for ATP to point out that the investment is intended to generate an attractive return for its members or strengthen the Danish defence industry. ATP manages pension funds on behalf of millions of Danes and therefore has a responsibility to investigate the human rights and international legal consequences of its investments.

ATP’s own description of Langsigtet Dansk Kapital emphasises active ownership, long-term partnership and participation in companies’ development. This makes it even more relevant to investigate what specific influence ATP has exercised in TERMA and whether that influence has been used to address the company’s supplies to military end users in Israel.

When ATP owns a significant part of TERMA, provides additional loan capital and has a representative on the company’s board, ATP’s role cannot be reduced to passive asset management.

It is precisely this direct and active involvement that makes ATP’s position particularly serious compared with that of the other Danish pension funds. ATP’s continued financial involvement must therefore be investigated in conjunction with TERMA’s production, exports, end users and the available documentation concerning the use of the company’s components in Israeli military operations.

Full transparency is needed regarding the size of the investment, the terms of the loan facility, the basis for ATP’s decision and its ongoing scrutiny of TERMA’s activities.

Danes’ pension funds must not be assessed solely on their financial returns. They must also be assessed on the activities and consequences they help finance.

9. The trade union movement — a responsibility that cannot be delegated away

There is another actor that must not escape public scrutiny: the Danish trade union movement.

Trade unions play a crucial role in the Danish pension system. They help negotiate the collective agreements underpinning occupational pensions, and they are represented in the management and board structures of key pension institutions.

This includes ATP, where employees are represented through the Danish Trade Union Confederation (FH) and a number of trade unions.

ATP’s board consists of equal numbers of employer and employee representatives, together with an independent chair.

The trade union organisations represented include 3F, Dansk Metal, HK, FOA and several other unions.

PensionDanmark likewise has a structure in which trade unions and employer organisations play a central role in the pension scheme’s management and industry boards.

This means that the trade union movement is not merely an external critic of pension funds’ investment decisions.

It also has institutional influence and opportunities to raise questions, make demands and work for change.

The trade union movement must therefore also be held accountable for how this influence is used.

If trade unions can mobilise members for demonstrations, political campaigns and solidarity actions for Palestine, yet fail to use their influence in pension systems to demand an end to investments supporting illegal settlements, a serious discrepancy arises between their public solidarity and their institutional actions.

Expressing concern is not enough.

Specifically, the trade union movement should:

•Demand full disclosure of pension funds’ investments in companies linked to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories.

•Work for the immediate divestment of investments in companies included on the UN list of activities in the illegal settlements.

•Ensure that pension funds conduct independent assessments of investments in arms manufacturers and military suppliers contributing to Israeli military operations.

•Demand binding investment policies excluding companies that contribute to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or the maintenance of illegal occupation.

•Give members genuine influence over pension funds’ ethical investment policies.

•Demand an explanation from ATP of its investment in TERMA, including its equity stake, loan facility, board representation and the specific requirements ATP imposes concerning the company’s exports and end users.

•Demand that ATP disclose how it has assessed the risk of financing a defence company whose components are incorporated into Israeli fighter jets.

The trade union movement represents millions of employees. It therefore has both a democratic and an institutional opportunity to influence how its members’ pension funds are used.

Solidarity is not only a matter of what one says at a demonstration. It is also a matter of what one accepts in the boardrooms where members’ money is managed.

10. Denmark and international responsibility — when does passivity become complicity?

The overall picture raises a fundamental question about Denmark’s international responsibility.

We have:

•A government that continues to maintain structures for military cooperation with the United States, even though American and Israeli weapons systems are used in operations that are the subject of serious findings under international law.

•Danish companies supplying components for F-35 fighter jets used by Israel.

•Danish transport and logistics companies that have been linked to the transport of military equipment to Israel.

•A state that has not imposed a general arms embargo on Israel.

•A legal system in which the Supreme Court has denied the four humanitarian organisations the opportunity to obtain a review of the legality of the F-35 export licences in question.

•Danish pension funds with investments worth billions in companies that, according to the UN, are involved in activities in the illegal settlements.

•A trade union movement with representation and influence in key pension institutions.

•ATP, which, through direct ownership, a substantial equity investment, a loan facility and board representation, is financially and institutionally involved in TERMA, a Danish defence company supplying the F-35 programme and providing components incorporated into Israeli fighter jets.

It is not necessarily the case that each of these circumstances, considered in isolation, constitutes an international crime.

But together they form an extensive network of political, industrial, economic and logistical connections requiring thorough and independent investigation.

Under the rules on international state responsibility, a state may, among other things, incur responsibility if, with knowledge of the relevant circumstances, it provides aid or assistance in another state’s internationally wrongful acts, provided the other legal conditions are met.

Article I of the Genocide Convention also entails an independent obligation to prevent genocide.

This means that Denmark must not merely refrain from committing genocide itself. Denmark must also use the means reasonably available to it to prevent genocide when it becomes aware of a serious risk.

It is therefore necessary to investigate whether Danish authorities, companies and institutions have acted in accordance with these obligations.

An independent review should be conducted of:

•All relevant Danish export licences for the F-35 programme.

•Danish companies’ military supplies and their known end users.

•The transport of military equipment to Israel through Danish companies and Danish ships.

•The Danish state’s oversight of military-related export and transport activities.

•Danish pension funds’ investments in companies linked to illegal settlements and military supply chains.

•ATP’s investment in TERMA, including the total capital injection, the terms of the loan facility, board representation and ATP’s knowledge of the company’s supplies and end users.

•Political decisions and the authorities’ responses to the documentation available since 2023.

It must be investigated who knew what, when they knew it, what options for action they had and why those options were not used.

If there are grounds for responsibility, these must be capable of examination by competent national and international bodies.

11. Criminal responsibility — individual intent, shared intent and knowing complicity

When the management of TERMA, other Danish supplier companies and financial institutions continue supplies, financing or investments after becoming aware of extensive documentation of international crimes, a concrete question arises about possible criminal responsibility for complicity.

The decisive issue is not only what the companies supplied or financed, but also what the responsible individuals knew, when they acquired that knowledge, what decisions they subsequently made and how their actions were connected to the crimes enabled by the assistance.

Shared intent and coordinated complicity

It must be investigated whether relevant actors — including suppliers, financial institutions, intermediaries and potentially others involved — shared an intent to support activities constituting or contributing to international crimes through continued supplies, financing or other practical assistance.

Shared intent cannot be presumed solely on the basis of parallel business decisions. It may, however, be relevant to investigate whether agreements, correspondence, meetings, risk assessments, internal decision-making processes or other specific circumstances demonstrate deliberate coordination or a common purpose.

It must likewise be investigated whether individual decision-makers intended to provide assistance and whether they had the requisite knowledge of the nature of the crimes and the specific consequences of their actions.

Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute covers persons who intentionally provide assistance or means for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime. Article 25(3)(d) concerns contributions to a crime committed by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, where the detailed conditions concerning intent and knowledge are met. These provisions show that both individual assistance and participation in a group with a common purpose may constitute relevant grounds for responsibility.

Under Danish criminal law, liability for complicity under section 23 of the Criminal Code must also be considered. The provision covers complicity through instigation, advice or action. The specific liability depends on the elements of the relevant offence and the mental requirements applicable to it.

Management responsibility and companies’ continued supplies

There should therefore be a specific investigation into what the management of TERMA and other Danish supplier companies knew about:

•The documented attacks and international crimes in which the supplied components or systems are involved.

•The Israeli end users and the military use of the supplied products.

•The documentation published by UN bodies, human rights organisations and investigative media.

•The conditions of export licences, end-user certificates and any warnings about the risk of use in violation of international law.

•The internal legal assessments and risk assessments carried out after publication of the documentation.

•The specific decisions to continue, modify or halt supplies.

If, after acquiring the requisite knowledge, responsible individuals actively decide to continue assistance that makes a concrete and substantial contribution to the crimes, there may be grounds for a criminal investigation into their personal responsibility. The same applies if the documentation shows that several actors deliberately coordinated their actions with the common purpose of maintaining this assistance.

An export licence or a contract with a foreign partner does not, in itself, confer immunity from criminal liability. Official approval does not automatically exempt a company or its management from responsibility if the independent conditions for criminal complicity are met.

Pension funds and financial decision-makers

Similarly, the management, investment managers and boards of Danish pension funds must be investigated when they maintain or expand investments in companies whose activities are documented as being linked to illegal settlements, military production or other serious violations.

It is necessary to distinguish between ordinary passive shareholdings and more direct financial assistance, such as targeted financing, loans, guarantees, underwriting or investments that specifically support particular activities.

The fact that a pension fund owns shares in a company is not, in itself, sufficient to establish complicity in genocide. But if its management has specific knowledge of particular activities and deliberately decides to make financial resources available to support them, it must be investigated whether those actions meet the conditions for criminal complicity. This also applies to the question of individual or shared intent.

ATP’s investment in TERMA requires a separate assessment in this context. ATP does not merely hold a passive shareholding: it has provided both equity and a loan facility, joined the board and thereby established a direct institutional connection to the company’s development.

It must be investigated what ATP’s responsible decision-makers knew about TERMA’s military supplies, what risk assessments were carried out and whether ATP’s continued financing and ownership were subsequently maintained despite specific knowledge of the relevant end users and uses.

If there is documentation that the financing was deliberately maintained for the purpose of supporting activities constituting international crimes, or that ATP’s responsible individuals participated in a common purpose to provide such assistance, this must be investigated under the relevant criminal law provisions.

Corporate liability and the demand for an investigation

Sections 25–27 and section 306 of the Criminal Code allow criminal liability for legal persons where the statutory conditions are met. Any corporate liability must be assessed separately from the personal liability of directors, board members and other decision-makers.

It is therefore not enough to examine companies’ formal export licences or their public statements. The authorities must investigate the actual supplies, the end users, internal knowledge, decision-making processes and any connections between the actors involved.

The demand is for an investigation — not pre-emptive exoneration

When extensive documentation of international crimes exists and Danish actors continue to supply, finance or otherwise support the relevant activities, the question of complicity cannot be dismissed on the grounds that these are ordinary commercial transactions.

There must be a genuine investigation into whether particular individuals and companies have provided criminal assistance, whether they acted with the requisite intent and whether there was a common purpose or coordinated effort.

This is not an automatic conclusion of guilt. It is a demand that no political, economic or institutional protection against investigation be granted when specific circumstances exist that may justify suspicion of criminal complicity.

DENMARK’S DOUBLE STANDARD — and the responsibility we can no longer evade

Denmark cannot continue to present itself as a consistent defender of international law while Danish companies, state authorities and financial institutions maintain connections that may contribute to Israel’s unlawful military and territorial activities.

Denmark cannot invoke the convention on international law when it comes to other states while treating its own military and economic interests as an exception.

Denmark cannot talk about human rights while failing to investigate whether Danish products, shipments and investments contribute to serious crimes.

Denmark cannot demand international accountability if Danish politicians, authorities and companies are not themselves subject to effective scrutiny.

And Danish pension funds cannot continue to manage the public’s savings without taking concrete responsibility for the human rights consequences of their investments.

It is not enough to say that one supports a two-state solution, wants a ceasefire or is concerned about developments.

What matters is whether one is willing to change the political, economic and military structures that help sustain the situation one publicly condemns.

Denmark must not merely condemn the crimes. Denmark must ensure that Danish resources do not contribute to them.

We therefore demand:

•An immediate halt to Danish arms deliveries and military components where there is an unacceptable risk of their use for genocide, war crimes or other serious international crimes.

•An independent investigation into Denmark’s participation in the F-35 programme and the use of Danish components in Israeli military aviation.

•A comprehensive investigation into Maersk’s, DSV’s and H. Folmer & Co.’s transport of military equipment to Israel.

•A public account of the Danish authorities’ knowledge and oversight of these supplies and shipments.

•An investigation into whether Danish political decision-makers and authorities have failed to fulfil their international obligations.

•Genuine access to judicial review of state decisions on arms exports and military support.

•An end to investments in companies helping maintain Israel’s illegal occupation and settlements.

•Full transparency in the investments of ATP, PensionDanmark and the other pension funds.

•A separate and independent investigation into ATP’s investment in TERMA, including its ownership stake, equity investment, loan facility, board representation and knowledge of the company’s supplies to Israeli military end users.

•A clear demand that the trade union movement use its representation and influence in pension systems to ensure responsible investments.

•A consistent Danish foreign policy in which international law applies regardless of the state’s political and military alliances.

•An independent investigation into possible individual and corporate criminal liability for Danish decision-makers and actors who, after documented knowledge, have continued supplies, financing or other assistance that may constitute criminal complicity.

•An investigation into whether shared intent or coordinated complicity exists between relevant companies, financial institutions, intermediaries and other actors.

This is not a matter of political sympathy for one side or the other.

It is a matter of international law, human lives and accountability.

The Palestinian people should not have to fight Israel’s military abuses alone. Nor should they be victims of an international system in which political alliances, economic interests and institutional passivity allow the crimes to continue.

And they should not be victims of Danish decisions, Danish companies and Danish investments on which we, as a population, have never been given a genuine opportunity to take a position.

We cannot demand accountability from the world if we are not willing to take responsibility ourselves.

No justice without accountability. No international law with special exceptions. No Danish money, weapons or resources for genocide and illegal occupation.

Palestine must be free. And Denmark must take responsibility for its own role.